CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND
THE INTERPRETATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT: WHERE WILL IT END?
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And now, We wish to speak to rulers of nations ... We beg of you, never
allow the morals of your peoples to be undermined ... [D]o not tolerate any
legislation which would introduce into the family those [artificial
contraceptive practices] which are opposed to the natural law of God.
Humanae Vitae—Encyclical Letter of Pope
Paul VI on the Regulation of Birth—1968

I. INTRODUCTION
In the waning days of the United States Supreme Court’s term last
summer, the longstanding clash between the United States Government and
forces aligned with the natural law of God concerning the contraception
mandate of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1
culminated in a victory for religious liberty by for-profit closely held
corporations;2 gave rise to the issuance of an extraordinary reprieve excusing
non-profit religious organizations from complying with an opt-out

*
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Of Counsel, Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C.; B.A., University of Iowa, 1974; J.D., University of Iowa
College of Law, 1977.
Member, Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C.; B.A., Drake University, 2005; J.D., University of Iowa College
of Law, 2008.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.). The contraception mandate requires
employer healthcare plans to provide coverage for specified services to women as part of a
comprehensive and no-cost preventive care and screening program. 42 U.S.C § 300 gg–13(a)(4)
(2010). Congress delegated the task of establishing these guidelines and specifications to the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Id. In consultation with the Institute of Medicine,
HRSA recommended coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.
Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. HEALTH
RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited May 1, 2015). The
Department of Health and Human Services formally adopted these recommendations and also
provided the HRSA the authority to exempt group health plans maintained by certain religious
employers. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issues Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,626
(proposed Aug. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147.130).
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768, 2785 (2014).
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notification provision of the mandate;3 and sparked cries of bewilderment
and betrayal by the dissenting justices in each of the two cases.4 In the first
decision, the Court divined an intent of Congress—dating back to the 1993
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)5 —to bestow
upon for-profit corporations the right to exercise religion.6 The legislative
rulers of our nation, the Court declared in the consolidated cases of Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.7 and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Burwell,8 granted for-profit corporations relief from government-imposed
substantial burdens on religiously motivated business practices if a less
restrictive means of achieving the compelling governmental objective
exists.9 Applied to the contraception mandate, the Court held that if human
shareholders of for-profits sincerely believe the natural law of God forbids
the use of certain female contraceptive drugs and devices, then their
companies are excused from adhering to the earthly obligation to subsidize
insurance coverage for such services unless the government can show there
is no other way to achieve the goals of the mandate.10 The government could
not make such a showing, the Court concluded, because it already had
established an accommodative process for non-profit religious
organizations.11
The religious empowerment of for-profits hinges on the change in
definition of “exercise of religion” in the 2000 amendment to RFRA.12 In
1993, Congress defined “exercise of religion” to mean “the exercise of
religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution.”13 In 2000,
Congress tweaked the terminology to “religious exercise” and changed the
definition to “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (order granting emergency application
for injunction pending appellate review).
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb4 (2012)), invalidated as to states and subdivisions by City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
Id.
Id. at 2759.
Id.
Id. at 2759–60.
See id. at 2761 (noting the most relevant part of RFRA for purpose of analyzing the scope of free
exercise protection is contained in the 2000 amendment). This amendment was enacted as part of
another statute. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub.
L.No. 106-274, § 7(a)(3), 114 Stat. 803, 806.
RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5(4), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993).
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central to, a system of belief.”14 A revolutionary change? Apparently.15 A
change in which Congress broke free from the gravitational and narrow orbit
of First Amendment jurisprudence the Court itself had recently imposed?16
Absolutely, according to the five-justice majority, which announced the 2000
definitional change amounted to nothing less than a “complete separation
from First Amendment case law.”17 RFRA now rules the world of religious
liberty in situations in which the federal government attempts to substantially
burden the exercise thereof.18 The Free Exercise Clause has been rendered
moot on governing the validity of federal action, the result of a Congressional
coup d’état brought on by the Court’s own failed stewardship.19 The Court
suffered this reversal of power gracefully—at least in the area presented by
the facts of these consolidated cases—sexual morality and contraceptive
use.20
Justice Ginsburg dissented.21 Joined by three of her colleagues, she saw
RFRA as restorative of a prior line of Supreme Court cases, not as a bold
initiative by Congress to expand protection for a class of commercial entities
whose owners could impose their religious beliefs on others.22 A minefield
of litigation surrounding the scope of religious excuses would ensue, she
feared.23
Three days later, on July 3, 2014, the Court enjoined the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) from enforcing a regulation that a nonprofit religious organization, otherwise exempt from providing contraceptive
care under HHS rules, must certify its religious objections on a governmentissued form and send a copy of the completed form to the third-party

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

See RLUIPA §§ 7(a)(3), 8(7)(A), 114 Stat at 806.(the definition is contained in section 8(7)(A) and
is incorporated into section 7, the section containing the 2000 amendments to RFRA).
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (recognizing that Congress, by enacting RFRA, went far
beyond what the Court held is constitutionally required).
See id. at 2761 (recognizing Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a decision in which the
Court had repudiated its twenty-seven-year-old balancing test Congress was now restoring).
Id. at 2762.
See id. at 2785 (acknowledging there is no need to reach the constitutional free exercise claim, a
claim which is judged by a more rigorous standard). In fact, the majority did not comment on the
dissent’s point that the First Amendment indisputably would not provide any relief to the claims of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See RFRA, Pub. Law. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) (amended 2000) (finding the
unalienable and constitutional right of free exercise needed to be protected by restoring the
compelling-interest balancing test the Supreme Court had virtually eliminated in Smith).
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760, 2785 (recognizing that RFRA largely repudiated its prior
method of analyzing free-exercise claims, and that the wisdom of RFRA is not the Court’s concern,
only its interpretation, as written).
Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2791–92.
Id. at 2805–06.
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administrator of its health insurance plan.24 All Wheaton College had to do,
pending appellate disposition of its contention that sending the form to its
third-party administrator made it complicit in the evil of delivery of
emergency contraceptives, was notify HHS in writing that it was a non-profit
that had religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage.25
Although HHS was aware of the identity of Wheaton College’s third-party
administrator, it is unclear how HHS is supposed to contact health care
coverage representatives of exempt organizations in other cases given the
limited notice required by the Court.26 Justice Sotomayor dissented,
believing along with the other two female justices, that the Court had
retreated from its assurances made three days previous that the joinder of forprofits in the same accommodative status as religious non-profits, would
have no impact on the ability of women from obtaining what Congress had
mandated—no-cost preventive contraceptive care.27 The Court is guilty of
misleading the country, she exhorted.28
There we have it—two decisions in three days with one unmistakable
message: Religiously based, anti-contraceptive beliefs held by either nonprofit religious organizational employers or shareholders of for-profit closely
held corporations are entitled to wide latitude in determining whether no-cost
contraceptive insurance coverage furthers the public-health interests of the
country.
HHS responded quickly to these judicial developments,
promulgating a set of interim final regulations on August 27, 2014.29 In
addition to recognizing the rights of for-profit, closely held corporations to
lodge religious objections to the contraception mandate,30 the department
proposed an alternate method of notice for the self-certification
requirement.31 Now a conscientious religious objector has the option of
notifying HHS of its objections, along with the name and contact information
of its health plan representative, so that HHS can, in the words of the Court
in Wheaton College, “facilitate the provisions of full contraceptive
coverage”32 to employees and dependents.33
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (order granting emergency application for
injunction pending appellate review).
Id. at 2807.
Id. at 2815 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2808.
See id. (stating Americans could not take the Court at its word, and that the Court’s action evinces
disregard for even the newest of precedent and undermines confidence in the Court).
Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092,
51,101 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 147.131(c)(1), (c)(2)(i)).
Id. at 51,094.
Id. at 51,101.
Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807.
See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at
51,101.
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Not surprisingly, this alternate means of notification did not placate all
litigants, some of whom successfully argued that submitting a notice of
exemption makes them accomplices in the sinful act of contraception, and
thus, substantially burdens their free-exercise rights under RFRA, justifying
the entry of a preliminary injunction against HHS from enforcing the
mandate.34 The end game for these twenty-first century conscientious
objectors, the authors submit, is the judicial establishment of a religious
principle akin to the 1968 papal decree that any legislative sanctioning of the
use of contraceptives cannot be tolerated.35 This is outrageous. ACA
proponents prevailed in the halls of Congress. Must the victors now conform
their conduct to the religious necessities of human shareholders of
corporations that are in the business of making money, not tending to souls?
This Article examines why RFRA was enacted and amended; the
questionable rationale employed by the Court to invent a for-profit freeexercise right; why the plain language of RFRA and constitutional tradition
command a different result; and why the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment is the last refuge against religiously based, anti-contraceptive
beliefs becoming the official position of the United States Government.
We begin with the story of the religious plight of two unemployed
peyote smokers in Oregon in the mid-1980s. Their tale of woe is the first
link in the causal chain of how the natural law of God, embodied in the anticontraceptive beliefs of profit-seeking human shareholders, emerged as a
papal-like beacon shining through the morass of immoral legislation.
II. SACRAMENTAL PEYOTE AND THE ENSUING LEGISLATIVE /
JUDICIAL TUSSLE
Peyote usage was a felony in Oregon in the 1980’s.36 Alfred Smith and
Galen Black, Oregon residents and members of a Native American Church,
ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a religious ceremony at their
church.37 When their employer found out, they were fired.38 They applied
for unemployment compensation benefits but initially were denied on the
34.

35.

36.
37.
38.

Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, No. 5:14-cv-00685-R, 2014 WL 7399195, at *4, *7 (W.D.
Ok. Dec. 29, 2014); Insight for Living Ministers v. Burwell, No. 4:14-cv-675, 2014 WL 6706921,
at *2-3, *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2014); Ave Maria School of Law v. Burwell, No. 2:13-cv-795-JSMCM, 2014 WL 5471054, at *1, *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2014). One court has rejected this argument.
School of the Ozarks, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 13-03157-cv-5-BP, slip
op. at 6-9 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2015).
Pope Paul VI, Humane Vitae: Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Paul VI on Regulation of Birth,
Vatican (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/
documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html.
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
Id.
Id.
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basis of felonious misconduct.39 The state administrative denial eventually
reached the United States Supreme Court, and the Court faced the question
whether the First Amendment free-exercise rights of Smith and Black had
been violated.40 In its 1990 decision, the Court answered no,41 and in the
process, fundamentally changed the constitutional prism of how claims of
governmental interference with religious freedom are to be viewed. No more
ascertaining whether the governmental action is a substantial burden on
sincere religious exercise; no more fear of stepping into the abyss of
evaluating the importance and centrality of religious doctrine; and no more
scrutinizing whether a compelling governmental interest, if any, outweighs a
claim of free exercise.42 In its place, a new constitutional viewfinder took
focus, one based on the legitimacy of the purpose and scope of the
governmental action.43 The Court held that as long as the law at issue is
neutral and generally applicable, the right of free exercise does not excuse
compliance.44
Congress was not happy, and indeed, its members were nearly united in
their reaction. By a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives and
with only three dissenters in the Senate, it enacted RFRA in 1993.45
Returning to the days of yesteryear, at least those years between 1963 and
1990, Congress cast aside the neutral and general applicability standard,
restored the compelling interest test, and added or ratified (depending on your
perspective) a requirement that any substantial burden on a person’s exercise
of religion be accomplished by the least restrictive means available.46
Congress did not define “person” or “person’s,” and its definition of
“exercise of religion”—“the exercise of religion under the First Amendment
to the Constitution”47—did not break new ground. In other words, Congress
had no problem with the Court’s past decisions on the scope of protected
exercise; it just wanted to resurrect a test which had struck a sensible balance
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.

Id.
Id. at 875–76.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 885–89.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §§ 2–3, 107 Stat. 1488-89 (1993) (amended 2000). In her dissenting
opinion in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the confusion on whether the least
restrictive alternative element was part of the judicial strict scrutiny analysis prior to Smith. See
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2793 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 509 (1997) (RFRA’s “least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith
jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify”) (Syllabus of Court), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963) (“[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no
alternative forms of regulation would combat [the problem] without infringing First Amendment
rights.”).
RFRA, § 5(4), 107 Stat. at 1489 (prior to 2000 amendment).
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between the traditional exercise of religious liberty and competing
governmental interests.48
As noted previously, however, Congress modified the definition of
“exercise of religion” in 2000.49 The path to this legislative adjustment is a
bit serpentine. In 1997 the Supreme Court declared that Congress had
exceeded its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment in
imposing RFRA’s requirements on the states.50 The decision arose from a
refusal by local zoning authorities to issue a building permit to the
Archbishop of San Antonio to enlarge a church located in a historic district
and the Archbishop’s subsequent RFRA challenge.51 Meanwhile, several
federal appellate courts required RFRA plaintiffs (all prisoners) to show their
religious exercise occupied a “central” role in their religion.52 In response to
both of these developments, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).53 State and local land use
regulation and state and local correctional oversight became subject to the
compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test if an affected person’s
religious exercise was substantially burdened.54 And in a specific directive
to the courts that it wanted to ensure maximum constitutional protection,55
Congress defined religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of belief.”56 Amending
RFRA as part of the enactment of RLUIPA, Congress incorporated the new
definition of “religious exercise”57 and also removed the reference to state
and local applicability.58 “Religious exercise” as defined in the two statutes
was now identical, and RFRA was expressly limited to actions of the federal
government. This was the extent of the 2000 amendments to RFRA, a
clarification or touching up, if you will, brought on by these separate
developments.
Fast forward ten years to the regulatory rollout of the ACA.59 Pursuant
to a Congressional directive that certain employer-sponsored group health
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. § 2, 107 Stat. at 1488.
See supra text accompanying notes 12–17.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
Id. at 511–12.
Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 819–20 (8th Cir. 1997); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d
489, 490-91 (6th Cir. 1995); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1478, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995);
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 948–49 (9th Cir. 1995).
RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–cc5 (2000)).
Id. §§ 2-3, 114 Stat. at 803–04.
Id. § 5(g), 114 Stat. at 806.
Id. § 8(7)(A), 114 Stat. at 807.
Id. § 7, 114 Stat. at 806.
Id. § 7(b), 114 Stat. at 806.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.).

482

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

plans cover preventive care and screenings at no cost for women,60 the Health
Resources and Service Administration (HRSA), in consultation with the
Institute of Medicine at the National Academy of Science, developed a set of
comprehensive guidelines.61 With respect to contraceptive services, HRSA
recommended that group health plans cover “[a]ll Food and Drug
Administration [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with
reproductive capacity.”62 FDA-approved contraceptive methods include oral
contraceptives, barrier methods, implants and injections, emergency oral
contraceptives, and intrauterine devices.63
HHS accepted the
recommendations and also proposed a religious employer exemption.64
Essentially covering only those in ministerial positions, the proposed
exemption was limited to those religious employers whose purpose was the
inculcation of religious values, who primarily employed and served people
of their own faith, and who were non-profit organizations within the meaning
of the Internal Revenue Code.65
Contentious does not begin to capture the ensuing public debate over
the scope of this religious exemption. Academics, religious leaders, health
care professionals, and John Q. Public weighed in loudly and sometimes not
so clearly;66 Catholic and other Christian employers expressed moral outrage,
arguing the mandate forces them to violate religious doctrine;67 and dozens
of lawsuits were filed seeking injunctive relief.68 HHS expanded the breadth

60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

65.
66.

67.
68.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMN., supra note 1.
Id. Other types of female preventive service for which health care coverage was recommended
include: well-women visits, screening for gestational diabetes, human papillomavirus testing,
counseling for sexually transmitted infections, counseling and screening for human-immunedeficiency virus, breastfeeding support, supplies, and counseling, and screening and counseling for
interpersonal and domestic violence. Id.
Birth Control: Medicine to Help You, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/
forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issues Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46626 (proposed Aug. 1,
2011).
Id.
See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemption from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 343, 348 n.17 (2014) (collecting examples of heated religious liberty rhetoric). The
government reports receiving over 400,000 comments to its proposed regulations. Coverage of
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,094 (Aug. 27,
2014).
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 66, at 344–45.
HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/ hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
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of the religious exemption,69 but the lawsuits kept coming.70 The
administrative parade of notice, comment, and revision came to an end on
August 1, 2013, with the adoption of the final set of regulations delineating
the scope of the religious employer exemption.71 The HHS determined that
churches and religious orders were exempt.72 Other religious employers,
denominated “eligible organizations,” can claim an exemption if they are an
organization 1) which holds itself out and operates as a non-profit entity and
as a religious organization; 2) opposes providing coverage for some or all of
the mandated contraceptive services on account of religious objections; and
3) is willing to certify that it is an organization which meets the preceding
criteria.73
Secular, for-profit corporations obviously did not meet the criteria.
Closely held, faith-based family corporations, in particular, objected, joining
the cavalcade of litigation arguing that because their shareholders believe that
human life begins at conception, because it is immoral to facilitate any act in
contravention of that belief, and because they are dedicated to the operation
of their corporations consistent with their faith, their free-exercise rights
under RFRA and the First Amendment are being substantially burdened.74
In the summer of 2013 the Third and Tenth Circuits reached conflicting
results on the RFRA free-exercise claims of two of these for-profit
corporations. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a family owned multi-million dollar
corporation with 13,000 employees prevailed in the Tenth Circuit;75
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

75.

Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474–
75 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013).
See HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 68 (itemizing by date when relief was granted
or denied in the injunctive suits challenging the mandate).
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870,
39,896-97 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131).
See id. at 39,896 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a)). The language of the regulation actually
speaks of nonprofit entities organized and operated as such and referred to in sections
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.
See id. at 39,896 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(1-4)).
Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274–76 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014); Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399, 402–03 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom.,
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *1-3 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 24, 2012), aff’d, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Serv., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738–39 (S.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d, 735 F.3d 654 (7th
Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284–85 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d en banc, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corporation, a much smaller family operation
out of Pennsylvania, was not successful.76 By the time the Supreme Court
granted certiorari,77 three more circuits had issued decisions on corporate free
exercise.78 A bit of background on all five cases is in order.
III. HARVESTING CORPORATE PROFITS WITH A CONSCIENCE
The Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination, believes “[t]he fetus
in its earliest stages . . . shares humanity with those who conceived it.”79
Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons are devout Mennonites.80
They are the only shareholders of a family wood-working business,
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, which is organized under
Pennsylvania law as a for-profit corporation.81 It employs 950 persons.82
The Hahns believe they are required to operate the company’s business and
endeavor to make a reasonable profit “in accordance with their religious
beliefs and moral principles.”83 In addition, the Hahns, in their capacity as
directors of the corporation, adopted a resolution titled “Statement on the
Sanctity of Human Life” in which they profess their belief that human life
begins at conception, and that it is sinful to be involved in the termination of
human life after conception.84 Of the twenty FDA-approved birth control
methods,85 the Hahns believe that four of them, two forms of “morning after”
pills and two types of intrauterine devices, may operate after fertilization of

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub. nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), rev’d sub. nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv.,
733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct.
2902 (2014); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (quoting Statement on Abortion, MENNONITE CHURCH USA (July
2003),
http://resources.mennoniteusa.org/resource-center/resources/statements-and-resolutions/
statement-on-abortion/).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa.
2013), aff’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Id. at 2764–65.
Id. at 2766. The approved methods are found at FDA, supra note 63.
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an egg occurs.86 Conestoga opposed the ACA requirement to provide
coverage for these four so-called abortifacients because the payment or
facilitation of the use of these drugs and devices would result in the Hahns
engaging in immoral and sinful conduct.87 Accordingly, Conestoga excluded
from its group-health-insurance plan these four contraceptive methods and
sought, along with the Hahns, an injunction against requiring their inclusion
in the plan.88 The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and a divided
Third Circuit affirmed, holding that for-profit secular corporations cannot
engage in religious exercise within the meaning of RFRA or the First
Amendment.89 The Third Circuit also rejected the claim brought by the
Hahns themselves because the HHS mandate did not impose any requirement
on them personally.90
The four alleged abortifacients were also the focus of injunctive actions
brought by two Oklahoma for-profit corporations and their shareholders
against HHS in federal court in Oklahoma.91 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and
Mardel, Inc. are businesses collectively owned by David and Barbara Green
and their children.92 Hobby Lobby is an arts and crafts chain with over 500
stores and about 13,000 full-time employees.93 Mardel operates thirty-five
Christian bookstores and employs close to 400 people.94 Like the Hahns, the
Greens believe that life begins at conception, and it would violate their
religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after
that point.95 Each family member signed a pledge to run the businesses in
accordance with the family’s religious beliefs.96 Based on those beliefs, both
corporations and all five Greens challenged the legality of the contraceptive
mandate.97 The district court denied a preliminary injunction but the Tenth
Circuit, sitting en banc reversed, finding the companies are “persons” within
the meaning of RFRA, that they had demonstrated irreparable harm, and that
they had established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claims.98 The

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2766.
Id. at 2765. The Greens operate the businesses through a management trust, of which each family
member is a trustee. Id. n.15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2766.
Id. The family also provided that the management trust would be governed according to the family
members’ religious principles. Id. at 2765 n.15.
Id. at 2766.
Id.
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case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining factors of
the preliminary injunction test.99
Before the Court granted the petitions for writ of certiorari in Conestoga
and Hobby Lobby on November 26, 2013,100 the Sixth, Seventh, and District
of Columbia Circuits similarly weighed in on the rights of for-profit
corporations to challenge the legality of the contraceptive mandate under
RFRA.101 All of the cases involve closely held corporations which are owned
and controlled by family members, all of whom are Roman Catholics and
believe, consistent with the church’s doctrines that all forms of artificial
contraception, not just the four so-called abortifacients, are against the
natural law of God.102 And like the Hahns and Greens, these Catholic family
members believe that offering contraceptive drugs and devices as part of an
employer-sponsored health plan is sinful as it makes them complicit in the
morally wrongful act of another.103
The Sixth Circuit sided with the Third Circuit’s approach in Conestoga,
rejecting the general claim that the family corporation is a person under
RFRA as well as the more specific argument that the shareholders’ freeexercise rights pass through to the corporate shell such that the corporation
is the real party in interest to assert their individual rights.104 In addition, and
consistent with the result in Conestoga, the family members’ claims were
dismissed based on the shareholder standing rule, namely, that shareholders
cannot bring claims intended to redress injuries incurred by the
corporation.105 The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, tracked the reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby, holding that a corporation is a “person” within
the meaning of RFRA.106 The District of Columbia Circuit took a different

99. Id.
100. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), rev’d
sub. nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
101. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated,
and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014); Korte v. Sebelius,
735 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d
1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment reversed, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902
(2014).
102. Autocam Corp, 730 F.3d at 620–21, cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub nom.,
Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014); Korte, 735 F.3d at 659, 662–64; Gilardi, 733
F.3d at 1210, cert. granted, judgment reversed, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
103. Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 621; Korte, 735 F.3d at 659, 662–64; Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1218.
104. Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 624–28.
105. Id. at 623. Another panel of the Sixth Circuit followed the result in Autocam five weeks later. Eden
Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 631–32 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and
remanded sub nom., Eden Foods, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
106. Korte, 735 F.3d at 682.
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path, holding that while a corporation is not a person under RFRA, the
shareholders have standing to assert claims on their own behalf as they have
been injured in a way that is separate and distinct from the harm incurred by
the corporation, an injury which gets around the shareholder standing rule.107
Five circuit court decisions, fourteen opinions among those five
decisions,108 and three different approaches form the prelude to the ultimate
resolution of the conflict between all forms of artificial contraception,109 as
mandated by the ACA, and a person’s religious objections thereto under
RFRA. We turn now to the Court’s decision in Conestoga and Hobby Lobby
of June 30, 2014.
IV. THE CANONIZATION OF CORPORATE AND HUMAN
SHAREHOLDER FREE EXERCISE
A. The Dogmatic View of Five
The question presented for writ of certiorari in both cases was identical:
“Whether RFRA allows a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the
heath coverage of contraceptives to which the employees are otherwise
entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation’s
owners.”110 The Court recast the issue stating it was charged with deciding
whether RFRA permits an agency of the United States Government to
demand that closely held for-profit corporations pay for female contraceptive
health care coverage for their employees and their dependents in violation of
the shareholders’ religious beliefs.111 By a 5-4 vote, the Court held HHS
could not lawfully make such a demand because its regulations impose a

107. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215-16.
108. The Tenth Circuit led the charge with six opinions. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d
1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014). Each panel member in Gilardi wrote an opinion, while the Conestoga and Korte cases
each produced two opinions. Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208; Contestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y
of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom.,
Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Korte, 735 F.3d 654..
Finally, Autocam was unanimous. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct.
2901 (2014).
109. Counsel for Hobby Lobby and Conestoga conceded at oral argument that his RFRA-based argument
encompasses objections to all forms of artificial contraception. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–
39, Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, 13-356).
110. Brief for the Petitioner at (I), Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., aff’d sub nom., Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2951 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief for Petitioner at (I),
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, rev’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.
v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-356).
111. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2757.
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substantial and impermissible burden on the free exercise of religion.112
According to the majority, the protection provided in RFRA for a “person’s
exercise of religion” clearly encompasses free-exercise rights of for-profit
corporations and the religious liberty of their human shareholders.113 In fact,
the majority declared, it is simply not possible to read the statute any other
way.114 Three major reasons were offered to support this unequivocal
interpretation. The first two relate to the meaning of “person;” the third, to
the scope of exercise of religion.
As RFRA does not define the term “person,” it is necessary, the Court
reasoned, to consult the Dictionary Act to determine its meaning.115 Under
the Dictionary Act, the word “person” includes corporations, companies, and
the like as well as individuals, unless the context indicates otherwise.116 The
context of RFRA does not indicate otherwise, the Court held, because viable
RFRA claims by non-profit corporations previously had been entertained, a
fact the government conceded.117 No conceivable definition of “person”
could include individuals and non-profit corporations but exclude for-profit
corporations, because giving the same word a different meaning for each
corporate category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.118
Second, corporations are fictionalized conduits for which the rights of
their human shareholders are formalized and protected.119 In the Court’s
words: “[w]hen rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of [the people associated
with the corporations].”120 Once lodged within the corporate shell and passed
through to human owners, the religious rights of these shareholders can then
be asserted by the corporation.121 In other words, a for-profit corporate
employer, an entity which must abide by the contraceptive mandate, has
standing to invoke the “passed-through” religious beliefs of its human
112. It is impermissible because the governmental action does not constitute the least restrictive means
of serving a compelling government interest. The government could have accommodated the free
exercise rights of these corporations and shareholders much like it did eligible religious
organizations by excluding contraceptive care from the group plan but allowing such care to be
separately paid for by the insurer. Id. at 2782.
113. Id. at 2768.
114. See id. at 2772 (dismissing the argument that the statute’s protection of the exercise of religion was
limited to those religious practices previously recognized by the Court before the 1990 Smith
decision).
115. Id. at 2768.
116. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
117. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
118. Id. at 2769.
119. See id. at 2708 (stating Congress indirectly employs the familiar legal fiction of corporation in
RFRA, the purpose of which is to protect human shareholders).
120. Id. at 2769.
121. See id. (stating the exclusion of rights to corporations protects the free-exercise rights of the
corporations and the religious liberty of the humans who own and control the corporations).
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shareholders as a reason not to comply.122 The irrefutable truth that business
corporations cannot exercise religion separate and apart from their owners is
irrelevant.123 They act through their human shareholders, intended thirdparty beneficiaries of Congressionally bestowed rights, who are the ones who
pray, worship, observe sacraments, seek meaning and spiritual fulfillment,
suffer the pangs of conscience, obey the commands of a higher authority, or
obtain moral sanctuary from the evils of the world.124
The moral sanctuary which the human shareholders of Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga sought for their companies was relief from the evils of
facilitating access of certain contraceptives to their employees.125 These anticontraceptive beliefs are religious in nature and part of a Christian and
biblically-based value system which each set of owners perpetuated in the
operation of their businesses, both in customer relations and in the delivery
of employee benefits.126 The perpetuation of this value system constitutes
the exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA according to the
majority.127 Invoking Smith’s noncontroversial observation that the exercise
of religion includes belief, profession of belief, and performance of (or
abstention from) acts,128 the Court found that the refusal to provide
employees legally mandated no-cost contraceptive coverage based on
Christian-based ethical objections “fell comfortably” within Smith’s
description of religious exercise.129
The Court’s triple play on the interpretation of RFRA, much like its
baseball metaphorical counterpart, leaves an observer stunned and
wondering how the event unfolded so quickly. How can a restorative statute
be transformed into one in which business corporations, never before thought
to enjoy religious protection, now do? How can the Dictionary Act’s
definition of person include corporation but only in the sense of an osmotic
membrane for the passage of the rights of shareholders, as long as those
shareholders are human beings? If Congress really wanted for-profit
corporations, closely held by human shareholders, to enjoy the protections of
the exercise of religion, why did it not just say so in plain English? Or, if
Congress wanted to limit the extension of religious rights to family-owned
corporations, what prevented it from expressing that clearly and
122. See id. at 2769 (allowing corporations to assert RFRA claims furthers and protects the individual
religious freedom of human shareholders).
123. Id. at 2768.
124. See id. (acknowledging individuals exercise religion through belief and action).
125. Id. at 2765–66.
126. Id. at 2771 n.73.
127. Id. at 2769–70.
128. Id. at 2770 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990)).
129. Id.

490

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

unambiguously? Did Congress know, let alone foresee, that its silent and
undefined treatment of “person” (a word never used in RFRA without a
possessive qualifier) would be interpreted as a “corporation” under the
Dictionary Act only to be “reversely pierced” in the same judicial breath to
mean human shareholders? The Court ignored the purpose of RFRA,
misinterpreted the text, and displaced the tradition of free exercise. Simply
stated, it invented or re-wrote the statute.130
B. Text and Tradition Displaced
The purpose of RFRA is expressly stated: To restore the compelling
interest test of Sherbert and Yoder in situations where government
substantially burdens a person’s free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment.131 “Restore” is not defined in RFRA so we must look to a
dictionary to ascertain the word’s ordinary, contemporary and common
meaning.132 And to make sure we do not go too far astray in interpreting that
ordinary meaning, we shall keep in mind the “acid test” proposed by Justice
Scalia that whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is best
determined if you can use the word in the sense ascribed at a cocktail party
without having people look at you funny.133 Although people at cocktail
parties may not usually converse by reference to a word’s prefix, a group of
rapt listeners would not look at you funny if you were to volunteer that the
prefix “re” is a common one in the English language and denotes a return to
a previous condition.134 Nor would faces crinkle in consternation if you were
to propose that viable synonyms for “restore” include reinstate, renew,
revive, revitalize, reestablish, reimpose, reconstruct, rehabilitate, or even,
bring back, fix, or mend.135 So, if you happen to be attending a cocktail party
on November 16, 1993, the date RFRA was enacted into law,136 you could
say in a company of straight faces that Congress just fixed the holding in
130. See infra text accompanying notes 140–45, 162–98, 217–33.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
132. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (holding a fundamental canon of statutory
construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning). Over the past twenty-five years, the Court has substantially
increased its use of dictionaries when construing text. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis
or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 486 (2013). Scholars link this use to the rise of textualism and its focus
on ordinary meaning. Id. Not surprisingly, controversy has ensued on whether this judicial
invocation of dictionary definitions is objective and authoritative or a subjective and, at times,
result-oriented approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at 486–87.
133. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Re Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/re? searchDictCode=all#RE (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
135. ROGET’S 21ST CENTURY THESAURUS 712 (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., 1992).
136. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 1490 (1993).

2015]

Corporate Free Exercise of Religion

491

Smith by reviving the compelling interest test. That revitalization, you could
accurately state, pertains to the test or standard itself; Congress did not
address nor did it expand the class of persons who can engage in the protected
exercise of religion, nor did it seek to extend the substantive boundaries of
free exercise.137 Whatever free-exercise rights persons possessed prior to the
passage of RFRA remain the same because exercise of religion is defined by
and limited to the First Amendment.138 In other words, by defining “exercise
of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution,” Congress made clear that persons who do not have First
Amendment rights are not protected by RFRA.139 Simply stated, the ordinary
meaning given to restoration of a balancing test cannot reasonably be
interpreted to include an expansion of protected persons or an enlargement
of underlying substantive rights.
Nor is the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” enlightening. Again,
the operative principle is not “person.”140 The word “person” never stands
alone or independent from “exercise of religion” in the text of RFRA. It is
used either as a singular noun in the possessive case (person’s exercise of
religion)141 or in conjunction with a personal pronoun in the possessive case
(person whose exercise of religion).142 Accordingly, “person” cannot be
parsed alone; as it qualifies or modifies “exercise or religion” (which, in turn,
is a defined term) the entire phrase, a person’s exercise of religion under the
First Amendment, must be construed.143 That is a road sign Congress posted
in the text of the statute. And there are rules of the road (discussed infra) the
Supreme Court has in place to assist in giving meaning to that phrase.144 But
the Court ignored the clear and unambiguous language of the sign and
selected a different path—the wrong path. Because the entire foundation of
the Court’s opinion rests on the unsupportable textual bifurcation of the
operative phrase, the rationale of the opinion is likewise unsupportable. By
equating person with corporation, the Court began its interpretive journey
down a “one-word” street, marked: WRONG WAY: DO NOT ENTER. And
during the course of this linguistic journey, the Court made some declarations
on corporate formation and purpose which, although worthy of some
137. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (stating the purpose of RFRA is only to overturn the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith, discrediting the notion that the Act could have unintentional
consequences or unsettle other areas of the law).
138. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 533 (2009) (Brown, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 533–34.
141. RFRA§§ 3(a), (b), 107 Stat. at 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b) (2012)).
142. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b)(2), 2000bb-1(c).
143. Gilardi v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1211–12 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
144. See infra text and accompanying notes 162–69.
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comment, are “quite beside the point.”145 In support of the “person is a
corporation” thesis, the Court implies that Congress was fully knowledgeable
about certain corporate principles when it chose not to define person.146 The
Court set forth these principles in a semi-syllogistic format and without
citation of authority:









A corporation is a legal fiction;147
It takes the form of an organization used by humans to achieve
desired ends;148
The desired end of a business corporation is to make a profit; 149
The purpose of the legal fiction is to provide protection for human
beings;150
If rights are extended by Congress to business corporations, the
purpose is to protect the corporation’s human shareholders;151
In RFRA Congress extended the right of free exercise of religion
to all corporations;152
General business corporations cannot, separate and apart from the
actions or belief systems of their human owners, exercise
religion;153
Thus, when free-exercise rights are extended to business
corporations, the purpose is really to protect the religious liberties
of their human shareholders.154

What is the Court really trying to say? Is there a distinction (or not)
between corporation and individual when it comes to religious exercise?
Where does the answer lie? It apparently does not lie with the concept of
associational standing for that involves the redressing of members’ rights and
injuries without a showing of injury to the association itself.155 Here, the
145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (commenting that although true,
it is quite beside the point that corporations cannot do anything at all, separate and apart from the
human beings who own, run, and are employed by them).
146. See id. at 2768 (stating Congress provides protection for the Hahns and Greens of the world through
the use of the familiar legal fiction of corporation).
147. Id. at 2768.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
552 (1996) (defining the modern doctrine of associational standing as one in which an organization
may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself).
An illustration of this concept apropos to RFRA is found in Gonzales v. O’Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). There the Court affirmed the grant of a
preliminary injunction under RFRA against the federal government in favor of a New Mexico
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association or for-profit corporation is injured or directly affected by the
contraception mandate.156 By not relying on Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission157 and the First Amendment right of corporations to
express themselves for political purposes,158 the Court backs away from
extending any constitutional free-exercise rights to corporations per se.159
What the Court appears to be saying with its refrain of human shareholder
protection is that at least on the “closely held corporate” facts before it, a
unity of interest exists between corporation and individual that is indivisible.
Stated otherwise, RFRA grants closely held, for-profit corporations religious
rights of their own, rights which are informed and brought to life by the belief
system of their human shareholders.160 Because the human shareholders
oppose the use of contraception, the corporation’s obligation under the ACA
to include contraceptive coverage in its workplace health insurance plan is
understood as a burden on the owners’ religious liberty and, in turn, on the
corporation itself.161 What a neat and tidy circle of logic, or more cynically
phrased, a closely held corporate Catch-22.
Enough of the corporate wrong-way detour; back to the phrase actually
posted on the Congressional road sign—a person’s exercise of religion under
the First Amendment. “The query is simple: do corporations enjoy the
shelter of the Free Exercise Clause? Or is the free-exercise right a ‘purely
personal’ one, such that it is unavailable to corporations and other
organizations because ‘the historic function’ of the particular guarantee has
been limited to the protections of individuals?”162 Several courts, judges, and
even Hobby Lobby in its brief attempted to answer this query by looking to
the “nature, history and purpose” of the Free Exercise Clause.163 These three

156.
157.
158.
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.

religious non-profit corporation which had sought equitable relief on behalf of its 130 members to
permit them to engage in the sacramental practice of drinking hallucinogenic tea. Id. at 433.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 342.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby did not back away from this position stating it saw
no reason why the Court would not recognize constitutionally-based, for-profit corporate religious
expression as it had already acknowledged First Amendment protection for corporate political
expression. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc),
aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 688 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
Id.
Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
Id.; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 724
F.3d 377, 384-85, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded sub nom., Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S.
Ct. 2901 (2014); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1168 (10th Cir. 2013)
(Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Korte, 735 F.3d at 696-98 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J.,
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factors or rules of the constitutional road, if you will, demonstrate that only
individuals and communities of believers, not secular corporations, enjoy the
shelter of the Free Exercise Clause. The heritage of religious liberty in this
country centers around an individual’s religious conscience and a community
of believers.164 The Supreme Court has accorded protection consistent with
this original design. Individuals, clergy, religious entities and organizations,
sects and congregations, and religiously affiliated educational associations
all have been held to fall under the umbrella of potential First Amendment
protection against government interference.165 One need look no further than
Smith, in which the Court provides a litany of case law and situations in
which the government either had overstepped its bounds in attempting to
regulate religious belief or surely would be prohibited from regulating certain
religiously motivated actions or abstinence from physical acts.166 Each
prohibited government regulation or purported prohibition—compelling
affirmation of religious belief; punishing the expression of religious
doctrines it believes to be false; imposing special disabilities on the basis of
religious views or status; lending its power to one or the other side in
controversies over religious authority or dogma; “assembling with others for
a worship service; participating in sacramental use of bread and wine;
proselytizing; [and] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of
transportation”—involves individuals, religious clergy, or religious
entities.167 In fact the Court in Smith used the word “individual” several times
in discussing the nature of First Amendment protection.168 More recently,
the Court echoed the community of believers’ concept by noting the text of
the First Amendment gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations.169
In contrast, nothing in the text of the First Amendment, Congress’s
debates, the historical context of the amendment’s ratification, or any
Supreme Court case suggests that artificial creatures of the law, incorporated
to make money while limiting the liability of its shareholders, are deserving

164.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

dissenting); Brief of Respondent at 24, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., aff’d sub nom.,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212-13. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of the Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488–90 (1990) (noting the
substitution of “free exercise of religion” for the “rights of conscience” in the constitutional
formulation signifies a desire to protect a community of believers or religious bodies from
governmental interference in addition to and even when the interference has no direct relation to a
claim of conscience).
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212–13.
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.. 694, 706 (2012).
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of constitutional religious protection.170 Unlike religious organizations,
which exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious
faith, workers who sustain the operations of for-profit corporations are not
commonly drawn from one religious community.171 In the pursuit of profit,
shareholders are not acting in their capacity as members of a religious
congregation or parishioners of a church. They do not comprise an
association of individuals joined together for a common religious purpose.172
They are investors, authorized by state law to issue stock and form a separate
legal entity, in the hopes of generating a positive monetary return on their
investment.173
Hobby Lobby attempts to seek shelter under the Free Exercise Clause
by arguing that an individual’s freedom to worship cannot be “vigorously
protected from interference by the [government] unless a correlative freedom
to engage in [a] group effort toward those ends [are] not also guaranteed.”174
While there may be some truth in this observation, Hobby Lobby and the
Court steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that the nature, purpose and history
of this correlative freedom relates to a community of believers who bring
themselves together to believe, profess, worship, and engage in sacramental
activities.175 There is no religious tradition for secular corporations,
170. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court had never, until today, extended religious exemptions to any entity operating
in the commercial, profit-making world); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212–13 (summarizing the history
of purpose of the Free Exercise Clause as encompassing only individuals and religious bodies, not
for-profit corporations); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377, 384–85, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (questioning how the Free Exercise Clause, designed to
secure religious liberty for the individual, can be interpreted to include within its umbrella of
protection a for-profit artificial being that is created to make money).
171. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. Ron Fein, Why Every Single Supreme Court Justice Got Hobby Lobby Wrong, JURIST (Sept. 18,
2014, 12:00 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2014/09/ron-fein-hobby-lobby.php.
173. Id.
174. Brief for Respondents at 24, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622 (1984)).
175. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (commenting on majority’s
forgetfulness for not recognizing that religious organizations exist to serve and perpetuate religious
values shared by a community of believers). From a Christian theological perspective, H. Richard
Niebuhr has expressed the role of churches succinctly and eloquently: “The purpose of the Church
is to increase among human beings the love of God and neighbor.” H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE
PURPOSE OF THE CHURCH AND ITS MINISTRY 31 (1977). Or, as voiced by the eminent theologian
Paul Tillich, one to whom the Court had looked for guidance in explaining the concept of religion
in the conscientious objector case of United States. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965):
[T]he Church gave an antidote against the threat of anxiety and despair, namely itself,
its traditions, its sacraments, its education, and its authority. The anxiety of guilt was
taken into the courage to be as a part of the sacramental community. The anxiety of
doubt was taken into the courage to be as a part of the community in which revelation
and reason are united.
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consisting of shareholders, officers, employees, or others associated
therewith.176 They have diverse personal beliefs, diverse degrees of religious
devotion, diverse moral compasses, and perhaps diverse notions as to
whether and how corporations ought to reflect their “ultimate concerns” in
business operations.177
More fundamentally, what distinguishes for-profits from religious nonprofits is the utilization of labor for financial gain rather than the perpetuation
of a religious value-based mission.178 Employees provide that labor, and by
accepting that labor, for-profit corporations submit to legislation designed to
promote employee welfare.179 This is the associational dynamic of forprofits—a far cry from joining your hands with fellow congregants in prayer
at a Sunday morning worship service or partaking of the sacraments, whether
it be taking Holy Communion at a Catholic service or ingesting peyote at a
Native American sacred gathering. The First Amendment is a prism through
which the validity of these claims are viewed, not the categorical imperative
of statutory definitional consistency as myopically reflected by a small sliver
of the corporate world which coincidentally happens to be closely held,
familial and unanimous in their pro-life beliefs. Although admitting that
Congress knows how to write a statute which links the meaning of a provision
to a constitutional source,180 the Court refuses to apply this rudimentary
principle to its interpretation of RFRA.
The Court believes it is justified in doing so because it is “obvious [the
2000 amendment to RFRA effectuated] a complete separation from First
Amendment case law.”181 It is true Congress deleted the reference to the First
Amendment when defining religious exercise. It is also true the definition
PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 95 (1952).
176. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the discrete and different
characteristics of ecclesiastical and lay corporations dating back to the time of Blackstone in the
mid-eighteenth century).
177. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 704 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
178. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded,
134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). In emphasizing definitional consistency in its opinion, the Court noted no
less than five times the government conceded that non-profit corporations are persons under RFRA.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769, 2769 n.20, 2771, 2774. True, but beside the point, the Solicitor
General argued at oral argument, for the query is not who or what is a person within the meaning
of RFRA, but rather what is the meaning of the phrase “person’s exercise of religion.” Transcript
of Oral Argument at 48, 51, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, 13-356). See supra text
accompanying notes 162–63.
179. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1242–43 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding when followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter
of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on
others in that activity).
180. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772.
181. Id. at 2761–62.
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changed colors—from one importing a meaning (“‘the exercise of religion’
means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution”)182 to one conveying inclusiveness (“‘religious exercise’
includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to,
a system of religious belief”).183 The circumstances leading up to and
surrounding the amendment, however, appear to support a conclusion far less
sweeping and grandiose than that announced by the Court. As discussed
previously, RLUIPA was enacted in response to the Court’s decision in 1997
that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment in mandating state compliance with RFRA.184 Three
years later, Congress turned to its powers under the Commerce and Spending
clauses to justify application of the compelling-interest test to two categories
of state action—land use regulation and management of institutionalized
persons.185 And while Congress was correcting the error of its constitutional
ways, it took the opportunity to fix the mistake lower federal courts had been
making since 1993 in imposing proof of centrality on prisoners’ claims of
infringement under RFRA.186 It effectively directed courts to return to the
182.
183.
184.
185.

RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5(4), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993).
RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 8, 114 Stat. 803, 806 (2000) (amending section 5 of RFRA).
See supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
RLUIPA §§ 2, 3, 114 Stat. at 803–04. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005)
(recognizing that Congress limited the reach of RLUIPA to two subjects, invoking its authority over
each by reliance on the Spending and Commerce Clauses).
186. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof by a prisoner that the
government is preventing a religious experience that the faith mandates); Werner v. McCotter, 49
F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803 (noting that governmental regulation must substantially burden religious activity that manifests
some central tenet of a prisoner’s individual beliefs or denies a prisoner a reasonable opportunity to
engage in activities that are fundamental to a person’s religion); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (rejecting RFRA claim by prisoner that an essential tenet of his religious beliefs was
substantially burdened); Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996), superseded by
statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803(recognizing that the substantial burden
requirement of RFRA must inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet
of religious belief or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs); Weir v. Nix,
114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803 (adopting the language of the Tenth Circuit in Werner). In a case not involving a prisoner, the
Fourth Circuit held that a parents’ economic burden, incurred due to the failure of the school board
to provide a cued speech transliterator to their hearing-impaired child at his religious school at no
cost, was not substantial. The Fourth Circuit found the parents and child were neither compelled to
engage in conduct prescribed by religious beliefs, nor forced to abstain from any action their
religion mandates they take. Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172 (4th
Cir. 1995).
Ironically, the Court contributed to the confusion surrounding the substantial burden element with
some sloppy dicta in Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). In re-citing the elements of the
compelling-interest test, the Court described the substantial burden as one which relates to a “central
religious belief or practice.” Id. at 699. This description, of course, was contrary to precedent.
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990); Thomas v. Review
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status quo ante.187 The amendment was not a change so much as a
“clarif[ication of] issues that had generated litigation under RFRA.”188
Congress made clear that neither compulsion nor centrality is an essential
feature of a religious belief system.189 This clarification was incorporated
into RFRA to ensure uniformity in enforcement.190 There is simply no
indication that the “any exercise of religion” phrase in the 2000 amendment
was intended to broaden the universe of persons protected by RFRA.191
Moreover, the absence of “First Amendment” in the 2000 definition
clarification of religious exercise is not the unambiguous and revolutionary
game-changer the Court makes it out to be.192 The Court claims its
responsibility is to interpret RFRA as written.193 If true, the Court would see
what an ambiguous mess Congress made out of the two statutes in providing
guidance on how “religious exercise” is to be construed. RLUIPA, chapter
21C of Title 42 of the United States Code, contains a rule of construction;
RFRA, chapter 21B of Title 42, does not. The rule of construction for
RLUIPA provides: “This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the
terms of this Act and the Constitution.”194 The absence of such a rule—or
any rule of construction for that matter—in RFRA means that only persons
affected by two limited categories of state governmental activity are entitled
to have their form of religious exercise construed to the maximum extent
permitted by the Constitution. This does not make a lick of sense.195 Why

187.
188.
189.
190.

191.
192.

193.
194.
195.

Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979);
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 450 (1969); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–87 (1944).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2792 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 30 (1999).
See id. (noting religious exercise need not be compulsory or central to the claimant’s religious belief
system).
Id. Also incorporated into RFRA was the second part of RLUIPA’s definition of “religious
exercise,” namely, that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of
religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or
intends to use the property for that purpose.” RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 8, 114 Stat. 803,
806 (amending section 5 of RFRA).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2761–62 (stating the reference to the First Amendment in RLUIPA and in the 2000
amendment to RFRA constitutes an obvious effort by Congress to effectuate a complete separation
from First Amendment case law).
Id. at 2785.
RLUIPA § 5(g), 114 Stat. at 806 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-3(g) (2012)).
The Court attempts to avoid this nonsense by arguing that the mere incorporation of RLUIPA’s
definition of religious exercise into the text of RFRA carries with it RLUIPA’s broad rule of
construction. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5. Stated otherwise, the Court claims the rule of
construction rides piggy-back on top of the definition when the latter is incorporated into the text
of RFRA. This claim is belied by the fact that the language of the rule of construction is anchored
to the RLUIPA chapter itself, and that RFRA, a separate chapter in the United States Code, contains
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should state prisoners and religious institutions that are affected by local land
use regulation be entitled to have their claims of religious exercise construed
more broadly than claims by all other classes of persons victimized by federal
governmental activity?
Congress did not intend such an absurd and inconsistent rule of
construction. Nor did it intend the deletion of the reference to the First
Amendment in the 2000 clarifying amendment to carry revolutionary weight.
In the same paragraph of the House report in which the authors explain the
need for clarification, they note that “religious exercise” under both RFRA
and RLUIPA includes only conduct that is the exercise of religion under the
First Amendment.196 Rather than construing the absence of the First
Amendment in the text of the 2000 amendment of RFRA as a Congressional
takeover of the most cherished amendment, rendering moot more than 200
years of constitutional protection against actions of the federal government,
the omission should be viewed as a legislative clarifying error, an inadvertent
deletion of the textual hook which had always precluded persons who did not
have First Amendment rights from asserting RFRA claims.197 Did Congress
really intend to hide an elephant of revolutionary religious change in a mouse
hole of an incorporated statutory phrase?198 Yes, the Court effectively
answers, creating a schizophrenic world of religious exercise between a
limited class of “state” RLUIPA persons protected by a broad rule of
construction and an expansive class of RFRA “federal” persons with no such
protection.
C. Don’t Blame Us
Wrapping up its opinion in Hobby Lobby, the Court writes: “The
wisdom of Congress’s judgment on this matter is not our concern. Our
responsibility is to enforce RFRA as written, and under the standard that
RFRA prescribes, the HHS contraceptive mandate . . . as applied to closely

no omnibus rule of construction governing the statute in its entirety. Id. at 2792 n.10 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
196. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 30 (1999).
197. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring).
198. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Congress does not ‘hide elephants
in mouseholes’”) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
Moreover, why would Congress confuse its revolution by incorporating into the text of RFRA the
entirety of RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exercise” that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of
real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the
person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.” Did Congress want to
make sure the use of real property for religious purposes would be protected the same under RFRA
as RLUIPA? Was such incorporation necessary in view of the all-encompassing scope of the “any
exercise of religion” phrase? The Court did not address these questions.
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held corporations, violates RFRA.”199 In their words, we [the Court] just
read the plain language of the text of the statute; we are not dispensing
constitutional justice. In fact we ruled twenty-four years ago that applying
the compelling-interest test to constitutional free-exercise claims “would
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”200 Congress disagreed
with our constitutional judgment, wrote a statute resurrecting the compellinginterest standard, amending it once along the way. With the guidance of The
Dictionary Act, we have interpreted the statute, and our job is done. If you
do not like the result, do not blame us; we told you so twenty-four years ago.
The Court’s blame avoidance is not so simple. Congressional
restoration of the compelling-interest test is not the same thing as a purported
Congressional bestowment of free-exercise rights on closely held
corporations, passed through to human shareholders in pursuit of for-profit
business goals. Reliance on The Dictionary Act, premised on a bifurcation
of the phrase, “person’s exercise of religion,” raises an issue of a resultoriented approach to statutory interpretation.201 Bifurcation provides a
foothold to for-profits to assert they are the proper “persons” under RFRA to
challenge the contraceptive mandate. The Court ignores one of the basic
principles of corporate law,
The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the
corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and
responsibilities due to its different legal status. . . . After all, incorporation’s
basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights,
obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural
individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs. 202

The Court brushes aside this traditional principle. Instead, it announces
the only purpose behind a Congressional extension of corporate statutory
rights is human shareholder protection,203 rendering moot over two centuries
of First Amendment protection against federal government interference.204
Why not go down the textually true path of a “person’s exercise of
religion” and debate, as the District of Columbia Circuit did, whether the
199. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. Characterizing the mandate as HHS’s is consistent with the
Court’s framing of the issue as opposed to the verbiage expressed in the petitions for writ of
certiorari. See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.
200. Id. (quoting Emp’t. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990)).
201. See supra note 132.
202. Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
203. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
204. See id. at 2761–62 (stating the 2000 amendment to RFRA was an obvious effort to effect a complete
separation from First Amendment case law).
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personal anti-contraceptive beliefs of the corporation’s owners are
substantially burdened by the mandate?205 There is no mystery that owners
are persons as distinguished from animals or things;206 that they meet the
three requirements of Article III standing (injury in fact, causation, and
redress of injury);207 that prudential considerations of standing, such as the
shareholder standing rule,208 do not apply;209 and that unnecessary
digressions into corporate form, public v. closely held applicability, the
purpose of bestowment of statutory corporate rights, and the talk of
discrimination against corporations as compared to sole proprietorships and
partnerships, can be avoided.210 All the “dramatic consequences”211 that go
with these digressions can likewise be avoided.
There is likewise little mystery that personal anti-contraceptive
beliefs—tied as they are to how human shareholders conduct their
businesses—are touched, affected, and indeed burdened by the mandate.212
But is the burden substantial? That is the question that needed to be debated
and decided. It certainly was brought to the table by the shareholders in
Gilardi, arguing that the government was forcing, coaxing, penalizing,
making, (fill in your participle of choice), them to participate and become
compliant in the commission of a grave moral wrong. 213 In assessing the
merits of this claim, courts are precluded, of course, from questioning its
plausibility.214 But courts can and should consider that religious beliefs of
shareholders are inextricably bound to a pursuit of a morally acceptable
business life, that owners are not required to use or purchase contraceptives
nor prohibited from publically expressing their disapproval of contraceptive
use, and that the mandate does not encourage employees to use
contraceptives any more than the payment of wages require purchase of such
drugs at the corner pharmacy.215 This debate never occurred.

205. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 733 F.3d 1208, 1212–15, 1217–19 (D.C. Cir.
2013); id. at 1227–31, 1237–39 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
206. Id. at 1215.
207. Id. at 1228 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Standing to assert a claim or
defense under RFRA is specifically governed by Article III by the Constitution. RFRA, Pub. L. No.
103-141, § 3(c), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(c) (2012)).
208. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990).
209. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1230-31 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2667-70 (2014).
211. Id. at 2767.
212. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1231 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Id. at 1218.
214. See supra text and accompanying notes 186–89.
215. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1237–39 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

502

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

Instead, an “argle-bargle”216 on closely held corporations is offered:
persons are closely held corporations; closely held corporations, standing
alone, cannot exercise religion; and human shareholders are the intended
beneficiaries of religious liberties formally extended to and bestowed upon
fictitious corporate shells.217 Fewer than half the states have a statutorily
created corporate form, a “close corporation,” and even for the states that do,
the definition of and requirements for such a business vary.218 What the
Court is really saying is that a “person” under RFRA is a corporation via The
Dictionary Act only if it exhibits the following characteristics:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

It is entirely family-owned;
It consists of a small number of shareholders;
The shareholders and the board of directors are co-extensive;
The family/shareholders/directors are unanimous in their religious
connections;
The family/shareholders/directors are unanimous in wishing to
seek an exemption from the contraception coverage requirement;
and
The companies have long held themselves out to employees,
customers and the public as companies operating under religious

216. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on the
majority’s opinion in Windsor holding unconstitutional the heterosexual definition of marriage in
the Defense of Marriage Act).
217. See supra text and accompanying notes 115–24, 147–54.
218. Comment on the definition of “eligible organization” for purposes of Coverage of Certain
Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 21, 2014), available at
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/prpcp_comments_on
_proposed_regs_corp_law_profs_for_submission.pdf. After an eleven-month comment period
and the receipt of more than 75,000 comments, the government published a final set of
regulations on the definition of “eligible organization” as it pertains to a “closely held for-profit
entity.” See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed.
Reg. 41318, 41324, 41346-47 (published July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C. F. R. 147.131 (b)
(2) (ii), (b) (4). In addition to the obvious features of not being a nonprofit entity and not being
publicly traded, a closely held for-profit entity must have more than 50 per cent of the value of
its ownership interest owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer individuals or have an
ownership structure that is substantially similar thereto. Id. at 41346. Various rules exist with
respect to performing the calculation. First, ownership interests owned by a corporation,
partnership, estate or trust are considered owned proportionately by such entity’s shareholders,
partners, or beneficiaries while ownership interests owned by a nonprofit entity are considered
owned by a single owner. Id. Second, an individual is considered to own the ownership interests
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his or her family. Id. at 41347. Family includes only
brothers and sisters (including half-brothers and half-sisters), a spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants. Id. Finally, if a person holds an option to purchase ownership interests, he or she is
considered to be the owner of those ownership interests. Id. With respect to claiming an
exemption and accommodation, the organization’s highest governing body (such as its board of
directors, board of trustees, or owners, if managed directly by its owners) must adopt a
resolution or similar action, under the organization’s applicable rules of governance and
consistent with state law, establishing its objections based on the owners’ sincerely held religious
beliefs. Id. at 41346.
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principles that constrain their business behavior in accordance
with the religious beliefs of the shareholders. 219

This brings to mind Humpty Dumpty scornfully lecturing Alice on the
nature of semantics: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to
mean—neither more nor less.”220 A new reality for the fictional world of
corporations now exists. “Puzzling,” Alice may have responded, or because
it fails his cocktail party “acid test,”221 Justice Scalia’s own soft epithet of
“jaw-dropping” may be most apropos.222
Having judicially canonized corporate free exercise, the Court then
proceeded to determine that shareholders’ religious liberties were
substantially burdened by financial penalties imposed for non-compliance
with the mandate,223 and that although no-cost contraceptive care may serve
a compelling governmental interest,224 it could be effected by a means less
restrictive than requiring these shareholders to fund contraceptive methods
in a manner that violates their religious beliefs.225 And there just happened
to be a less restrictive alternative in place, a self-certification exemption
offered by HHS to religious employers that still ensured employees and their
dependents no-cost care.226 This is what the Court was talking about in its
opening remarks about an expansion of the exemption having “precisely
219. Id. at 2. An interesting example of the fallout of including for-profits within the definition of person
in a religious freedom statute recently occurred in Indiana. The Indiana Legislature had specifically
defined person in the Religious Freedom Restoration statute to include an individual; an
organization organized and operated primarily for religious purposes; and a corporation,
partnership, limited liability company, or any other entity that may sue or be sued and that exercises
practices that are compelled or limited by a system of religious belief held by individual(s) who
have control and substantial ownership of the entity. See Ind. Code §34-13-9-7 (Effective July 1,
2015). Faced with an avalanche of negative publicity surrounding the potential use of the statute
as a tool to discriminate, primarily on the basis of sexual orientation, the legislature quickly
amended the statute to add a definition of “provider” which essentially included for-profits and
excluded religious organizations and their clergy and then further amended the statute to prohibit
a provider from refusing to offer or provide services, facilities, the use of public accommodations,
and goods on the basis, inter alia, of race, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity. See Ind.
Code §34-13-9-0.7 and §34-13-9-7.5. (Effective July 1. 2015).
220. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS
186 (New American Library 1960). Judicial references to Alice’s wonderings number well over
1,000, her encounter with Mr. Dumpty being one of the most frequently cited. Parker B. Potter, Jr.,
Wondering About Alice: Judicial References to Alice in Wonderland and Through the LookingGlass, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 175, 176–77 (2006).
221. See supra text accompanying note 133.
222. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76, 2779 (2014) (noting that if the
group health plans do not cover the contraceptives at issue, the corporate plaintiffs will be taxed
$100 per day for each affected individual, which in Hobby Lobby’s case would amount to $475
million per year).
224. Id. at 2780.
225. Id. at 2872.
226. Id.
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zero” impact on female employees of Hobby Lobby and other corporate
plaintiffs.227 That may be true, but in dicta leading up to this finding of a less
restrictive approach, the Court chartered a path for corporate employers and
religious non-profits to claim an exemption from the exemption-notification
process, an impact that is anything but precisely zero.228 In fact, its impact,
if fully implemented, constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause. 229
The Court wasted no time taking its first step down this path when, three days
after deciding Hobby Lobby, it issued a temporary injunction prohibiting
HHS from requiring a religious employer to certify its religious objections to
the mandate on a government-issued form and to send a copy of the
completed form to the third-party administrator of its health-insurance
plan.230 But we are getting ahead of ourselves. First, we must discuss the
Hobby Lobby dicta.
V. THE PROCESS OF EXEMPTION, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Before identifying the HHS accommodative approach as the basis for
its lesser-restrictive-means holding, the Court in Hobby Lobby had a few
choice words to say about the viability of no-cost healthcare legislation
within the context of a strict scrutiny analysis. And the Court was not
positive:
The most straightforward way [of the Government achieving its desired
goal of cost-free contraceptive care] would be for [it] to assume the cost of
providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to
obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’
religious objections. This would certainly be less restrictive of the
plaintiffs’ religious liberty, and HHS has not shown . . . that this is not a
viable alternative.231

Subsidizing, in whole or in part, the cost of contraceptive drugs and
devices, the Court added, may even warrant the creation of entirely new
legislative programs in order to satisfy the least restrictive command of the
RFRA strict scrutiny test.232
227. See id. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby
Lobby and other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero.”).
228. See infra notes 232–33, 253, 268–70 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 271–77 and accompanying text.
230. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2807.
231. Id. at 2780.
232. Id. at 2781. Justice Ginsburg took objection to what she characterized as this “let the government
pay” alternative, arguing it would impede women’s receipt of benefits “by requiring them to take
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Minimizing the potential fallout of this stark dictum, Justice Kennedy
added a concurring comment.233 He emphasized that the Court, although
discussing Hobby Lobby’s argument that the Government should pay for the
objectionable drugs and devices, withheld judgment on whether this is a
“proper response to a legitimate claim for freedom in the health care
arena.”234 And echoing Establishment Clause concerns of a unanimous court
in Cutter v. Wilkinson,235 he observed that a person’s free exercise of religion
may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.”236
So the question remains: will the self-certification process, if
challenged directly, satisfy the least-restrictive means test while still
providing precisely zero impact to female employees covered under an
employer’s group health plan? The first hint came three days later with the
issuance of an emergency injunction by the Court in Wheaton College v.
Burwell.237 Wheaton College, a religious non-profit entity clearly exempt
from the mandate, asserted the exemption itself impermissibly burdened its
free-exercise rights under RFRA on the theory that sending the governmentissued form to the third-party administrator of its health plan made it
compliant in providing contraceptive services by triggering the obligation of
the administrator to provide the services to which it objects.238 The language
of the government form, EBSA Form 700, requires an authorized
representative of the organization to certify that the health coverage it
establishes, maintains, or arranges, qualifies for a religious accommodation
from providing contraceptives sources without cost sharing.239 The form
then directs the organization to provide a copy of the certification to its health
insurance issuer or third-party administrator, as the case may be, “in order
for the plan to be accommodated with respect to the contraceptive coverage

233.
234.
235.

236.

237.
238.
239.

steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded and administered] heath benefit,”
a step Congress did not contemplate. Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Coverage of
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,888 (July 2, 2013)).
Id. at 2785–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). In Cutter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
RLUIPA from a facial attack by prison officials that the accommodation of prisoners’ religious
rights violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 720. The Court noted, however, that in properly
applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation
may impose on non-beneficiaries. Id.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy believes HHS carried
its burden to show the mandate serves a compelling governmental interest in providing insurance
coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female employees. Id. at 2785–86. Although the
four dissenters agree, five votes exist to support an actual finding of fact that the first prong of the
RFRA strict scrutiny test is satisfied. Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).
Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2816 (Appendix).
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requirement.”240 With all three female justices dissenting, the Court issued a
conditional injunction: if Wheaton College informed HHS in writing of its
eligibility for a religious exemption, it need not use Form 700 nor need it
send a copy of the form to its third-party administrator, and HHS would be
enjoined from enforcing the pertinent provisions of the mandate pending
final disposition of appellate review.241 The interlocutory injunction was
issued pursuant to the All Writs Act.242 Interestingly, the last two Chief
Justices of the Court had previously declared that injunctions issued under
this statue, to block the operation of a duly enacted law and regulation, in
cases where the courts below had not yet adjudicated the merits and where
the courts had declined request for similar injunctive relief, were proper only
if the legal writs at issue were indisputably clear.243
Justice Sotomayor authored a blistering dissent, which was joined by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan.244
Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at
our word. Not so today. After expressly relying on the availability of the
religious-nonprofit accommodation to hold that the contraceptive coverage
requirement violates RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit
corporations, the Court now, as the dissent in Hobby Lobby feared it might,
retreats from that position. That action evinces disregard for even the
newest of this Court’s precedents and undermines confidence in this
institution.245

After all, as Justice Sotomayor notes, RFRA requires Wheaton to show
accommodation “substantially burden[s] [its] exercise of religion.” Can it be
that availing itself of the very accommodation designed to prevent its
participation in administering contraceptive services is a substantial burden?
In a word, no. That is because the law requires some entity provide
contraceptive coverage. The operation of law imposes the guarantee of
contraceptive coverage—not a religious non-profit’s election not to be the
entity that provides coverage. And, even if the minimally burdensome
paperwork necessary for the Government to administer the accommodation
could be deemed substantial, then it is the least restrictive means.246 As
Justice Sotomayor points out, the Court has no business rewriting
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 2807.
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
Lux v. Rodrigues, 131 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers).
244. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2808.
246. Id. at 2814.
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administrative schemes,247 and even if it did, the Court’s scheme of using two
stamps (where the non-profit who wishes to be exempt notifies DHS, who
then has to notify the unnamed third-party administrator) as opposed to one
(the nonprofit notifies its third-party administrator directly on the simple
form provided) does anything but make the accommodation process easier.248
Justice Sotomayor concluded the Court failed to appreciate “a simple truth:
The Government must be allowed to handle the basic tasks of public
administration in a manner that comports with common sense.”249
The grant of an interlocutory injunction in Wheaton College was by no
means the final word and may well have raised more questions than it
answered:








What are the rights of Wheaton College that are “indisputably
clear?”
What part of RFRA puts on hold the “written equivalent of raising
a hand in response to the government’s query as to which religious
organizations want to opt out[?]”250
Does the Wheaton College injunction strengthen the Hobby Lobby
dicta and foreshadow how the Court will deal with objections to
the exemption notification process and thus, to the future viability
of the mandate?
If the objections are upheld on the merits, does that amount to an
“unlawful fostering of religion?”
Will the recent HHS regulation of an alternative notice process
make a difference?
How will Justice Kennedy untie the Gordian knot of the “let the
government pay”251 polemic, as voiced by the other four members
of the Hobby Lobby majority and the four dissenters?252

Some religious employers appear to think the Hobby Lobby dicta is their
legal ticket to salvation from complicity in the grave moral evil of facilitating
contraception through participation in the exemption notification process. It
was the cornerstone of their less-restrictive alternative pitch to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in the first federal appellate case to reach the
merits of the validity of the HHS regulation promulgated after the Wheaton
College injunction.253
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 2815.
Id.
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 232–37 and accompanying text.
Joint Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 19, Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5368).
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Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services254
forms the jumping-off point as to why religious objections to providing
contact information to an insurance representative or a third-party
administrator do not constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise and
why any argument that they do, runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.
There, eleven Catholic organizations (who employ both Catholics and
non-Catholics) in the D.C. area claimed the regulatory accommodation that
permitted them to opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement under
the ACA itself, imposed an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs'
religious exercise in violation of RFRA.255 Plaintiffs asserted that the notice
they submit in requesting accommodation is a “trigger” that activates
substitute coverage, and that the government will “hijack” their health plans
and use them as “conduits” for providing contraceptive coverage to their
employees and students.256 Plaintiffs claimed the government has no
compelling interest in requiring notice of their desire to opt out and has not
shown the notice requirement is the least restrictive means.”257 The D.C.
Circuit disagreed.
The court stated that notice was not a substantial burden on the
objector.258 Rather, completing the one-page form was the equivalent to
raising a hand in response to a government query.259 And the suggestion by
plaintiffs that submitting the one-page form implicated them in the process
of providing contraceptive coverage was also meritless.260 Burdens that fall
to third parties are not substantial burdens.261 And here, the opt-out
(accommodation) shifts to the government, a third party, the obligation to
insure for female contraceptive services (the requirement the objector
opposes). At bottom, the free exercise of religion does not allow a religious
objector to dictate Government conduct simply because it offends sincerely
254. After the HHS regulation of August 27, 2014, the process of exemption, as stated by the Court in
Priests for Life, “works simply:”
A religious organization that objects on religious grounds to including coverage for
contraception in its health plan may so inform either the entity that issues or administers
its group health plan or the Department of Health and Human Services. Delivery of the
requisite notice extinguishes the religious organization's obligation to contract, arrange,
pay, or refer for any coverage that includes contraception. The regulations then require
group health plan insurers or administrators to offer separate coverage for contraceptive
services directly to insured women who want them, and to inform beneficiaries that the
objecting employer has no role in facilitating that coverage.
772 F.3d at 236.
255. Id. at 239.
256. Id. at 237.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 247.
259. Id. at 250.
260. Id. at 252.
261. Id. at 248.
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held religious sensibilities, as incidental effects of government programs that
do not coerce individuals to act in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs
are permissible.262 The “act” here is filling out a form, which is not against
Catholic beliefs, and the beneficiaries receive coverage—not due to the optout form but rather because the ACA imposes that obligation.263 In fact, the
court characterized the alleged burden of the opt-out Form “a single sheet of
paper” as “de minimis.”264
In short, the substantial burden argument is groundless:
Religious objectors do not suffer substantial burdens under RFRA where
the only harm to them is that they sincerely feel aggrieved by their inability
to prevent what other people would do to fulfill regulatory objectives after
they opt out. They have no RFRA right to be free from the unease, or even
anguish, of knowing that third parties are legally privileged or obligated to
act in ways their religion abhors. . . . “Government simply could not operate
if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”265

Thus, RFRA was no aid to the Priests for Life objectors because RFRA
only grants objectors a right to be free of any unjustified substantial
governmental burden on their religious exercise.266
The court went on to find that even if the accommodation was a
substantial burden, it furthered a compelling governmental interest by
promoting public health (reducing unwanted pregnancies and medical risks
that flow from the same to mother and child) and gender equality (unwanted
pregnancies bear greater economic burdens on women).267 Finally, the D.C.
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Hobby Lobby dicta previous
discussed. Plaintiffs argued that the Government could offer such lesser
restrictive alternatives as “tax deductions or credits for the purchase of
contraceptive services, expand eligibility for existing federal programs that
provide free contraception, allow women to submit receipts to the federal
government for reimbursement, or provide incentives for pharmaceutical
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 246 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).
Other circuits agree on the lack of a substantial burden. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the
Aged, Denver v. Burwell. No. 13-1540, 2015 WL 4232096, at *29-30 (10th Cir. 2015);
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, No.14-2396, 2015 WL 3988356, at *3-5 (7th Cir. 2015); East Texas
Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, No. 14-20112, 2015 WL 3852811, at *5 (5th Cir. 2015); Geneva Coll. v.
Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human, Serv., 778 F. 3d 422, 428 n. 3, 442 (3d Cir. 2015),
stay denied sub nom., Zurik v. Burwell, Nos. 14A1065, 14-1418, 2015 WL 3947586 (2015).
267. Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 264.
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companies to provide contraceptives free of charge to women.”268 All of
these alternatives would substantially impair the government’s interest and
pose financial, logistical, informational, and administrative burdens on
women.269 Quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hobby Lobby, the
court noted that RFRA does not permit religious exercise to “unduly restrict
other persons, such as employers, in protecting their own interests, interests
the law deems compelling.”270
This in turn raises an Establishment Clause issue. In Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor,271 the Supreme Court held that a statute that favors one religion
over all other interests violates the Establishment Clause because “[t]he First
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own
interests others must conform their conduct . . .”272 Accordingly, the Court
struck down a Connecticut statute providing Sabbath observers with an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath as a violation of
the Establishment Clause, since the primary effect of the statute was to
impermissibly advance religion.273
Citing Caldor, the Court in 2005 rejected an Ohio prisoners’ RLUIPA
challenge that prison officials failed to accommodate their exercise of a
“nonmainstream” religion by
denying them access to religious literature, denying them the same
opportunities for group worship that are granted to adherents of mainstream
religions, forbidding them to adhere to the dress and appearance mandates
of their religions, withholding religious ceremonial items that are
substantially identical to those that the adherents of mainstream religions
are permitted, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their faith. 274

The Court stated:
courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries, and they must be satisfied
that the Act's prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among
different faiths.275

268. Id. at 265.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 266 (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2786-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
271. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
272. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
273. Id.
274. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
275. Id. at 709.
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In other words, a permissive accommodation of religion’s exercise must not
“devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion.”276 As the Establishment
Clause is a constitutional preexisting external limit on any rights confined by
statute, it supersedes any application of RFRA that violates it. Thus, the
argument that a particular government rule or measure is not the least
restrictive approach to accommodate a person’s religious liberties is trumped
if the consequence of that argument violates the Establishment Clause.277
VI. CONCLUSION
Repudiating the assertion of Justice Ginsburg, that the accommodation
granted to Hobby Lobby and Conestoga may impact the rights of thousands
of their female employees or dependents of their employees,278 the Court
proclaimed the impact precisely zero.279 These folks, the Court states, have
access to insurance without cost-sharing for all FDA-approved
contraceptives, access that furthers an assumed compelling public health
interest.280 So when Jane Doe, a thirty-five-year-old mother of four, making
close to minimum wage as a retail clerk at a pro-life and exempt Christianbased family corporation, gets seen by her family physician for artificial
contraception needs, there should be precisely zero problems with the nocost delivery of that care and any follow-up, such as a prescription or an
intrauterine device. No doubt about it, according to the Court.281 Although
Ms. Doe’s insurance card will show a subscription to a plan which does not
provide contraceptive services, her employer’s health insurer or a third-party
administrator will have received all the necessary information from the
employer to administer her insurance claim. Or will it have all the
information? Can her corporate employer effectively deny Ms. Doe’s care
by claiming its human shareholders are religiously prohibited from providing
a notice of exemption? Surely not. Surely, the injunction in Wheaton
College will not obtain permanent status. Surely, the Court will not back off
its assurance of meaningful access by equating the exemption-notification
process with a substantial burden on religious exercise. We know the three

276. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
334–35 (1987).
277. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemption from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 375
(2014).
278. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 2760 (majority opinion).
280. Id. at 2760, 2780.
281. See id. at 2760 (“Under [an HHS accommodation for corporate religious objections, female
employees] would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.”).
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female justices are not totally convinced.282 It defies belief the Court would
backtrack. The Court did not contest the argument by HHS that the system
of religious exemption and simultaneous full contraceptive access imposes
no net burden on the insurance companies that are required to provide the
coverage.283 Five justices believe the contraceptive mandate serves a
compelling public health interest.284 The accommodative system in place is
an “alternative that achieves all of the Government’s aims while providing
greater respect for religious liberty.”285 Alternate notice to the HHS is now
on the table, such that HHS can directly rely on this notification “to facilitate
the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the [ACA].”286 How else
is full contraceptive coverage effectuated other than by HHS receiving the
relevant contact information about the insurance payors from the employers,
the ones who obviously possess this information?
For-profits now have an exemption. Can they, with a straight face at a
cocktail party or before the highest court in the land, contend this right of
exemption is self-executing, and their simply saying so is the end of the
matter. No notification to anyone is required; just leave us alone. It can be
said, but it cannot constitutionally be done. The Court has already endorsed
employer notice to HHS;287 it has assured all of us “who are bound by [their]
decisions”288 that full and meaningful access continues in the face of an
expanded exemption;289 and it has effectively held that the will of the people,
expressed in the passage of the ACA, will not be impinged.290 The executive
branch of government has read Hobby Lobby and Wheaton, accepted a role
as the recipient of the exemption notice, and promulgated proposed
regulations to coordinate the delivery of no-cost insured care.291 Cries of
being complicit with, facilitating, initiating or triggering a moral and evil act,
discussed in the preceding section, cannot carry the day. 292 These may very
well be the sincere beliefs of conscientious objectors, but those beliefs, under
the law, are not substantially burdened by sending what amounts to a postcard
to HHS with the name, e-mail address, and phone number of their insurance
282. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan).
283. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
284. See supra note 237.
285. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
286. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807.
287. See id. at 2807 (conditioning the issuance of an injunction against enforcement of employer
notification to healthcare representatives on EBSA form 700 upon the employer notifying HHS, in
writing, of its religious objection to providing coverage for contraceptive services).
288. Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
289. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759–60.
290. See id. at 2759–60 (finding that all of the Government’s aims of no-cost contraceptive coverage
under the ACA are not impeded by expanding the HHS accommodation to owners of for-profit
corporations who have religious objections to providing group health contraceptive coverage).
291. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 253–57 and accompanying text.
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contact. Such a holding would result in the judicial blessing of the following
principle of law:
Consistent with the Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI on the Regulation
of Birth, objections to the contraception mandate of the ACA that are
compelled by a sincere religious belief, including but not limited to the mere
notification of opting out of the mandate, are hereby ESTABLISHED as
immutable and unconditional principles of the United States of America.

This principle may bear a papal imprimatur, but it violates the first
clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the “First
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious
necessities.”293 So said Learned Hand in 1953,294 and so said the Court in
1985, quoting Judge Hand.295 So should the Court re-state and re-affirm this
principle today.

293. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953).
294. Id.
295. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting Otten, 205 F.2d at 61).

